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EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATIONS IN THE TIME
OF CORONAVIRUS
Laura Kent-Jensen*
Abstract
When COVID-19 first emerged in the United States, the pandemic
sparked a rush to provide protective gear, develop tests to detect the
disease, and implement effective containment strategies to stop the spread.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) used its Emergency Use
Authorization (EUA) process to facilitate the rapid market introduction of
medical devices (authorized but unapproved) to combat the emergent
public health threat. Unfortunately, performance problems with some
medical devices stymied initial containment efforts, arguably resulting in
greater spread and suggesting a need for improvement in the EUA
process.
By reviewing the statutory requirements of the EUA process, this
Note examines how the process is intended to function and where it came
up short during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Note then identifies the
medical devices (diagnostic tests and personal protective equipment) that
are most likely to require EUAs during a potential future pandemic and
reveals a regulatory gap in quality control procedures that enabled nonperforming devices to reach the market during the current pandemic.
Finally, the Note proposes a solution that would likely fill this regulatory
gap and help the FDA achieve its goals in the event of another infectious
disease emergency. The solution is to require an independent test of the
manufactured product to ensure it meets its performance specifications
before releasing the medical device to the market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), Alex
Azar, declared a national public health emergency and affirmed his department’s
commitment to “protecting the health and safety of all Americans . . . .”1 Just four
days later, Secretary Azar determined “that circumstances exist justifying the
authorization of emergency use of in vitro diagnostics for detection and/or diagnosis
of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) . . . .”2 Through the Emergency Use
Authorization (EUA) process, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enables
companies to quickly bring important medical products to the market.3 Specifically,
EUAs allow products aimed at protecting healthcare providers, diagnosing patients,
and providing treatments or cures “to reach patients in need when there are no
adequate, FDA-approved and available alternatives.”4 However, the product itself is
1

Press Release, HHS Press Office, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Secretary Azar
Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus U.S. Dep’t
Health & Hum. Servs. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31/secret
ary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html [https://perma.
cc/Z22U-NBG4].
2
Determination of Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 7,316-01 (Feb. 7, 2020).
3
FDA Combating COVID-19 with Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/media/136702/download [https://perma.cc/65WQ-BFR3] (last updated
Nov. 24, 2020).
4
See id.
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not “FDA approved”5 and does not necessarily meet the stringent regulations
established by the FDA to assure efficacy and safety.6
By relying on companies to verify their own products, the FDA permitted
products to reach the market much more swiftly, precisely as intended by the EUA
process during a national emergency. Yet, problems with the medical devices and
tests procured through this streamlined process have repeatedly required the FDA to
issue warnings and clarifications regarding safety and accuracy,7 calling into
question the adequacy of emergency regulations. This Note will briefly review the
EUA process, examine how effectively the EUA regulations have met objectives
during the coronavirus pandemic, and propose a legislative solution for improving
the EUA process without impeding overall goals.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FDA Oversight of Medical Devices
The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, codified in 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.,8
did not include medical devices until the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.9
5

Id.
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Update: FDA Informs Public About Possible Accuracy Concerns with Abbott ID NOW
Point-of-Care Test (May 14, 2020), [hereinafter Abbott ID NOW Point-of-Care Test]
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fdainforms-public-about-possible-accuracy-concerns-abbott-id-now-point [https://perma.cc/
DHG4-82SC].
7
The FDA issued multiple updates each month during the COVID-19 pandemic,
including warnings about specific medical device warnings and modifications to existing
EUAs. See, e.g., Abbott ID NOW Point-of-Care Test, supra note 6; Press Release, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Reissues Emergency Use
Authorizations Revising Which Types of Respirators Can Be Decontaminated for Reuse
(June 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid19-update-fda-reissues-emergency-use-authorizations-revising-which-types [https://perma.
cc/M4ZK-RS27]; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Update: FDA Revokes Emergency Use Authorization for Chloroquine and
Hydroxychloroquine
(June
15,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-revokes-emergency-use-authorizationchloroquine-and [https://perma.cc/AQS9-ZU92]; Press Release, Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Update: FDA Warns of Newly Discovered Potential Drug Interaction That May Reduce
Effectiveness of a COVID-19 Treatment Authorized for Emergency Use (June 15, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fdawarns-newly-discovered-potential-drug-interaction-may-reduce
[https://perma.cc/44JB7L6B].
8
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2018).
9
A History of Medical Device Regulation & Oversight in the United States, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (June 24, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overview-deviceregulation/history-medical-device-regulation-oversight-united-states [https://perma.cc/7QC
G-8CWG].
6
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The U.S. Code now defines medical devices to include any instrument, article, or
part which is “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in
the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”10 Specifically, in vitro
diagnostic (IVD) tests11 and personal protection equipment (PPE), such as filtering
facepiece respirators, are regulated as medical devices.12 The FDA has identified
these devices as essential to the effort to control the spread of COVID-19 because
IVD tests detect the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, thus diagnosing disease, and PPE
devices minimize transmission of the virus.13
B. Standard Regulations for Approval of Medical Devices
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) defines the standards a medical device
must meet to receive FDA approval.14 To evaluate a product, the FDA relies upon
scientific evidence, including well-controlled investigations, studies, case histories,
and reports of experience, “from which it can fairly and responsibly be concluded
by qualified experts that there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness
of a device under its conditions of use.”15 In addition, the FDA establishes
performance standards for the medical device and rigorous requirements for quality
control systems, including good manufacturing practices, to ensure ongoing safety
and effectiveness.16 Together, these standards, controls, and practices provide
assurance that when medical devices are marketed to and utilized by healthcare
personnel or patients, they will work as intended without harming public health.
The FDA categorizes medical devices into three classes, requiring varying
degrees of regulation for each class to provide reasonable assurance of safety and

10

21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(1)(B).
IVD tests are used to detect diseases or other conditions in “samples such as blood
or tissue that have been taken from the human body.” In Vitro Diagnostics, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/products-and-medicalprocedures/in-vitro-diagnostics [https://perma.cc/8KM5-EHW8]. When a person is tested
for COVID-19, a positive result means the IVD test detected the virus in the sample.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 Testing Basics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/coronavirus-disease-2019-testing-basics
[https://perma.cc/7P8L-55X7] (last updated Apr. 7, 2021).
12
See Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(May 25, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergency-situations-medicaldevices/coronavirus-covid-19-and-medical-devices [https://perma.cc/3FKX-JMB6].
13
See id.
14
See Medical Devices, 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.1–820.250 (2020); see also Overview of
Device Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/overview-device-regulation
[https://perma.cc/4Z6L-82BA] (last visited Aug. 3, 2021) (outlining the basic regulatory
requirements for manufacturers of medical devices).
15
Medical Device Classification Procedures, 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c).
16
See Procedures for Performance Standards Development, 21 C.F.R. §§ 861.1–861.38
(2020); see also Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1–820.250 (2020).
11
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effectiveness: Class I in which “general controls are sufficient”;17 Class II, which
requires special controls to address particular concerns;18 and Class III for which
“premarket approval is . . . required.”19 The FDA must consider “the probable benefit
to health from the use of the device weighed against any probable injury or illness
from such use” and “the reliability of the device” when classifying a medical product
and determining which specific controls might be needed.20 For example, nonsurgical face masks are Class I medical devices with general controls, while surgical
N95 respirators are Class II devices whose approval depends upon testing and
certification by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).21
C. Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)
Congress established the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) program
through the Project BioShield Act of 2004 “as part of a broader strategy to defend
America against the threat of weapons of mass destruction.”22 The EUA program is
a mechanism “to accelerate the research, development, acquisition, and availability
. . . of safe and effective medical countermeasures to protect the United States” from
chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threats.23 By design, EUAs provide
special authority for unapproved medical products to be used “in a public health
emergency stemming from a terrorist attack with . . . a biological . . . agent, or a

17

21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2020).
Id. § 860.3(c)(2). Special controls often address intended use, performance standards,
and labeling requirements that are specific to the product. See, e.g., Denise N. Johnson-Lyles,
What Does Having a FDA Cleared Pregnancy Test Mean?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July
16, 2013) (illustrating the type of specific performance and labeling standards that may be
required for regulatory clearance of a Class II device).
19
Medical Device Classification Procedures, 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2020).
20
Id. § 860.7.
21
Surgical Devices, 21 C.F.R. § 878.4040 (2020). NIOSH verifies that an N95 mask
filters at least 95% of airborne particles, while the FDA requires surgical masks to be fluid
resistant and to protect against large droplets and sprays of hazardous fluids. A surgical N95
respirator must meet both requirements. See Understanding the Difference, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/pdfs/UnderstandDiffer
enceInfographic-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E2D-ZF8V] (last visited July 7, 2021). Standard
N95 respirators are also Class II medical devices that meet only the NIOSH filtration
standard. See, e.g., 3M, Surgical N95 vs. Standard N95 – Which to Consider?, TECH. BULL.
(June 2020), https://multimedia.3m.com/mws/media/1794572O/surgical-n95-vs-standardn95-which-to-consider.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB67-UHNW].
22
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Project BioShield Overview,
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES.GOV, https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/cbrn/
project-bioshield-overview/ [https://perma.cc/X7RS-KMUK] (last visited July 7, 2021); see
also Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–276, 118 Stat. 835.
23
HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 72 Fed. Reg. 13109 (Mar. 20,
2007).
18
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naturally occurring emerging infectious disease.”24 Each EUA is intended to be a
temporary measure that provides authorization only during the time of national
emergency.25 However, in practice, companies have marketed authorized, but FDA
unapproved, products for years after the original EUA date of issuance.26
Significantly, while non-emergency FDA rules are extensive and detailed in the
CFR, the EUA process is governed only by the Authorization for Medical Products
for Use in Emergency (Medical Products EUA) federal statute, 21 U.S.C § 360bbb3.27 The EUA process does not have corresponding FDA regulations. Under the
Medical Products EUA statute, the HHS Secretary may authorize emergency use of
a product that “is not approved, licensed, or cleared for commercial distribution”
during a public health emergency.28 The Secretary may also authorize an
“unapproved use” of a product that has been previously approved for a different
treatment or application.29 Either type of authorization applies to medical products,
which includes drugs, devices, or biological products.30
To issue an EUA when public health is threatened by a serious disease, the
Secretary must “conclude[] . . . that, based on the totality of scientific evidence
available to the Secretary, . . . it is reasonable to believe that . . . the product may be
effective in diagnosing, treating, or preventing” the disease.31 Because the process is

24

What Are Medical Countermeasures, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 26, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/about-mcmi/what-are-medical
-countermeasures [https://perma.cc/GA4Q-C798].
25
Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–276, 118 Stat. 835, 854–58.
Generally, the authorization terminates when the declaration of emergency terminates, upon
the earlier of the emergency circumstances ceasing to exist or on the one-year anniversary of
the declaration. Id.
26
FAQs on Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) for Medical Devices During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-emergency-use-authorizations-medical-devices
/faqs-emergency-use-authorizations-euas-medical-devices-during-covid-19-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/HSS8-8NKL] (last updated Apr. 23, 2021). For example, fourteen Zikarelated medical products that were authorized in 2016 or 2017 are still marketed under EUAs
today. See Emergency Use Authorizations for Medical Devices: Zika Virus Emergency Use
Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/emergency-situations-medical-devices/emergency-use-authorizations-medicaldevices [https://perma.cc/DJY3-R76F] (last visited Aug. 3, 2021) [hereinafter Emergency
Use Authorizations for Medical Devices] (showing active EUAs for Zika testing).
27
Authorization for Medical Products for Use in Emergencies, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3
(2017).
28
Id. § 360bbb-3(a)(2)(A).
29
Id. § 360bbb-3(a)(2)(B).
30
Id. § 360bbb-3(a)(1).
31
Id. § 360bbb-3(c) (emphasis added).
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intended to be fast and flexible, there are very few conditions that the Secretary is
required by statute to impose on the authorized product. Once the Secretary issues
an EUA, the product may be legally introduced into interstate commerce for public
use.32
D. Regulations During the COVID-19 Pandemic
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA has issued more than 250 EUAs
applicable to IVD tests and PPE, an unprecedented number.33 As during previous
outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as Zika, the FDA has amended existing EUAs
to allow expanded usage of, or improvements to, the devices in cooperation with
companies and laboratories.34 However, the FDA has also reversed its authorization
policies based on new information, issued advisories against use, and removed
manufacturers from its authorized list for specific medical devices.35 Quality
problems, in particular, have stymied some FDA efforts to rapidly deliver safe and
effective products to the market for the benefit of public health.36 These problems

32

Id. § 360bbb-3(a)(1).
During the H1N1 pandemic, the FDA issued a total of nineteen EUAs for IVD tests
and PPE, which was the pre-COVID-19 record. See Historical Information About Device
Emergency Use Authorizations: In Vitro Diagnostics (IVD) & Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., [hereinafter Historical Information About
Device Emergency Use Authorizations] https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergencyuse-authorizations-medical-devices/historical-information-about-device-emergency-useauthorizations#ivd [https://perma.cc/BQS2-FKF6] (last visited Aug. 3, 2021) (listing all
historical EUAs for IVD tests and PPE). In comparison, at least 249 EUAs have been given
solely for COVID-19 molecular IVD tests. See In Vitro Diagnostics EUAs - Individual EUAs
for Molecular Diagnostic Tests for SARS-CoV-2, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-emergency-useauthorizations-medical-devices/in-vitro-diagnostics-euas-molecular-diagnostic-tests-sarscov-2#individual-molecular [https://perma.cc/B4E7-AM6M] (last visited Aug. 3, 2021).
34
Emergency Use Authorization: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) EUA
Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., [hereinafter Emergency Use Authorization:
Coronavirus]
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legalregulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization#covid19euas [https://perma
.cc/C5XQ-5P48] (last visited Aug. 3, 2021).
35
Id.
36
Id.; see also Emergency Use Authorization--Archived Information: Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) EUA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., [hereinafter Emergency Use
Authorization--Archived Information] https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-andresponse/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization-archiv
ed-information#covid19 [https://perma.cc/RE3Y-33R9] (last visited Aug. 3, 2021); supra
text accompanying note 7; Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/counterterrorism-andemerging-threats/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/YSJ5-M3ZN] (last
visited Aug. 3, 2021) (providing a summary of updates).
33
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contributed to the undetected spread of COVID-19 in several U.S. communities,
which seeded outbreaks and prevented the implementation of early containment
strategies.37
III. ANALYSIS
This section begins by identifying the types of products that since 2004 have
been repeatedly authorized for emergency use under the EUA regulations. It then
examines how the regulations have changed and become more flexible over time. A
discussion of the key provisions of the EUA regulations lays the foundation for
comparison to the standard FDA-approval process and reveals that discretionary
measures are an important feature built into the EUA process. This flexibility is
necessary to enable rapid response to unpredictable circumstances in an emergency;
however, when compared with the standard FDA approval process, the EUA
regulations leave a gap. The COVID-19 pandemic provides an illustration of
problems that arise as a result of this regulatory gap and hinder the FDA’s ability to
protect public health. Finally, this section synthesizes a solution that can bridge the
gap, reconcile the competing objectives, and help the FDA to fulfill its mission.
A. EUAs Are Frequently Issued for Certain Medical Devices
For protection against influenza, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) recommends a three-step plan: vaccination, preventive actions to
stop spread, and treatment in the case of infection.38 The preventive actions include
avoiding close contact with those who are sick, covering the nose or mouth when
coughing or sneezing, and staying home if infectious.39 While these actions, aimed
at the general public, are for a known threat, essentially the same preventive
measures are recommended for any outbreak of disease, including COVID-19.40
Moreover, these measures map to the types of medical devices that are similarly
aimed at prevention: tests that identify who is infectious and respirators that cover
the nose and mouth.
37
See Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sherry Fink, Katie Thomas
& Noah Weiland, The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronaviruspandemic.html [https://perma.cc/R4RW-XM8D].
38
Prevent Seasonal Flu, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/prevent/index.html [https://perma.cc/D5TT-GW2K] (last visited
Oct. 22, 2020).
39
Id.; see also Everyday Preventive Actions Can Help Fight Germs, Like Flu, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/freere
sources/updated/everyday-preventive-actions-8.5x11.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9RQ-6TT5].
40
See Coronavirus Disease 2019, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html [https://perma.cc/KL62-6ZQW]
(last visited Aug. 3, 2021) (recommending testing, wearing a mask, and if sick, staying
home).
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Since 2004, the HHS Secretary has determined that several well-known
outbreaks were public health emergencies warranting authorization of unapproved
medical devices. These outbreaks included the H1N1 (swine flu) pandemic in 2009
and the material threats of Ebola and Zika viruses in 2014.41 During these outbreaks,
EUAs were issued only for diagnostic tests and for personal protective equipment,
specifically N95 respirators.42 These devices are essential to protecting those who
are healthy and identifying those who are ill as a means to contain the illness and
prevent its spread.43
Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the first medical devices the FDA
authorized were IVD (COVID-19 diagnostic) tests and PPE. By June 1, 2020, the
FDA granted eighty-five EUAs for IVD tests and fifteen EUAs for PPE, four of
which addressed filtering respirators or face shields.44 The consistency with which
the FDA issues EUAs for diagnostic tests and protective equipment suggests that
these devices are frequently essential to public health and will almost certainly be
the subject of future EUAs. Consequently, Class II medical devices, which include
diagnostic testing and protective equipment, are the target of the regulatory
improvements this Note recommends.45
Therapeutic medical products, a second step of the CDC protection plan, take
more time to develop when a new infectious disease emerges.46 As a result, the few
41
42

33.

43

Id.
See Historical Information About Device Emergency Use Authorizations, supra note

See, e.g., Stephen M. Parodi & Vincent X. Liu, From Containment to Mitigation of
COVID-19 in the US, 323 JAMA 1441, 1441–42 (Apr. 21, 2020) (discussing “precaution
equipment like N95 masks,” tests “to establish the extent of community spread,” and
isolation of infected patients as mitigation measures).
44
See Emergency Use Authorization: Coronavirus, supra note 34.
45
Other types of medical devices are less suitable for EUAs. Class I devices “present
minimal potential for harm to the user” and are generally exempt from the regulatory process.
Class III devices are a smaller class of life-sustaining or implanted devices which need
greater regulation to ensure safety. See Learn If a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA
for Marketing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/consumer
s-medical-devices/learn-if-medical-device-has-been-cleared-fda-marketing [https://perma.
cc/374J-ZBYH] (last updated Dec. 29, 2017).
46
After the health emergency was announced on January 31, 2020, the first COVID-19
IVD test received an EUA four days later. In contrast, the first EUA for a COVID-19
treatment came four months later on April 30, 2020. Compare HHS Press Office, supra note
1 (announcing the emergency on January 31, 2020), and FDA Combating COVID-19 with
Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/136702/down
load [https://perma.cc/R6PP-V889] (last updated Nov. 24, 2020) (identifying the CDC’s
2019-nCoV Real-Time RT-PCR Diagnostic Panel as an authorized in vitro diagnostic on
February 4, 2020), with FDA Combating COVID-19 with Therapeutics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/136832/download [https://perma.cc/TRQ3-Z4JN] (last
updated Dec. 2, 2020) (identifying Fresenius Medical Care’s continuous renal replacement
therapy as the first authorized therapeutic), and Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to
Denise Oppermann, Fresenius Medical Care (Apr. 30, 2020), [hereinafter “Letter to Denise
Oppermann”] https://www.fda.gov/media/137520/download [https://perma.cc/LFS2-S4ZS].
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instances where the FDA issued EUAs for drugs during previous outbreaks were
limited to unproven uses for drugs that had already received FDA approval.47 In the
case of COVID-19, the intense national focus on the pandemic increased attention
on treatments, leading to off-label use even without an EUA.48 In response, the FDA
implemented a Coronavirus Treatment Acceleration Program (CTAP) specifically
to address the need for rapid development of safe and effective treatments for
COVID-19.49 However, according to the FDA website, the overwhelming majority
of EUAs granted through August 2021 were for medical devices, providing ample
evidence that medical devices are far more likely to receive EUAs than therapeutic
treatments.50
The third action of the CDC protection plan, vaccination, also takes significant
time to develop when a new virus emerges.51 Because a vaccine is a biological
product, the FDA can authorize an emergency use, and, in fact, the FDA granted its

47

The FDA authorized only three drug treatments for H1N1 and issued no EUAs for
Ebola or Zika treatments. See Emergency Use Authorization--Archived Information, supra
note 36 (showing the three archived drug EUAs for H1N1); Emergency Use Authorization:
Coronavirus, supra note 34 (showing no EUAs for treatments of Zika or Ebola). One H1N1
treatment, peramivir, that was authorized by an EUA had mixed results. See Debra Birnkrant
& Edward Cox, The Emergency Use Authorization of Peramivir for Treatment of 2009 H1N1
Influenza, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2204 (2009) (noting that the success of the treatment was
difficult to ascertain).
48
See Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Enhanced Danger of
Physicians’ Off-label Prescribing During a Public Health Emergency, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES
1, 2–3, 14–16 (June 28, 2020) (discussing the negative consequences of prescribing drugs
for unapproved uses and proposing regulation of experimental use even during a public
health crisis).
49
Coronavirus Treatment Acceleration Program (CTAP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/coronavirus-covid-19-drugs/coronavirus-treatment-acceleration
-program-ctap [https://perma.cc/F7QZ-JES5] (last updated July 16, 2021). Multiple types of
treatments have been studied, including antivirals, cell and gene therapies,
immunomodulators, and neutralizing antibodies, and ten COVID-19 treatments received
EUAs. Id. One treatment is now FDA-approved. See FDA Approves First Treatment for
COVID-19, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/P59P4JHT].
50
See Emergency Use Authorization: Coronavirus, supra note 34 (showing the vast
majority of current EUAs are for IVD tests and other medical devices, rather than
therapeutics); see also Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices [https://perma.cc/P59P-4JHT] (last visited Aug. 4,
2020) (highlighting numerous medical devices related to COVID-19 and linking to
“Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) for COVID-19”).
51
See C. PHYSICIANS PHILA., Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation, C.
PHYSICIANS
PHILA.,
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccinedevelopment-testing-and-regulation [https://perma.cc/HK4M-U6NM] (last visited Aug. 4,
2021) (“Vaccine development is a long, complex process, often lasting 10-15 years . . . .”).
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inaugural EUA for an anthrax vaccine in 2005.52 However, between 2005 and the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the FDA did not authorize any vaccines using the
EUA process. Instead, the FDA used its full regulatory process to approve an Ebola
vaccine in 2019 without need for an EUA.53 The urgency of the COVID-19
pandemic caused the FDA to issue guidance for EUAs for vaccines to protect against
coronavirus.54 Further, the U.S. government created an initiative, Operation Warp
Speed, to focus executive actions on the rapid development of COVID-19
vaccines.55
Consequently, COVID-19 vaccines were developed and authorized for
distribution prior to receiving FDA approval.56 Even in this clear emergency,
however, an EUA for a COVID-19 vaccine is only granted as a temporary measure
to allow the vaccine to be given to the public while its manufacturer pursues FDA
approval. The full approval process continues to be preferred by the FDA and by

52

Emergency Use Authorization--Archived Information, supra note 36 (showing
issuance on Jan. 14, 2005 and termination on Feb. 1, 2006). The Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
(AVA) was the subject of multiple court actions to establish whether the military could
administer the unapproved AVA to service members without their consent. After the D.C.
District Court issued an order halting the vaccination program “‘unless and until FDA
classifies AVA as a safe and effective drug for its intended use,’” the Court examined
whether the 2004 Project BioShield Act created another option for administering the vaccine.
Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-707, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5573, at *1 (D. D.C. Apr. 6, 2021).
The Court modified the injunction to allow defendants to administer AVA “‘on a voluntary
basis, pursuant to the terms of a lawful emergency use authorization (‘EUA’) . . . .’” Id. at
*2–3 (citation omitted). However, the Court explained its rationale as an interpretation of
congressional intent with the BioShield Act and expressly made “‘no finding as to the
lawfulness of any specific EUA that has been or may be approved by the Department of
Health and Human Services.’” Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
53
See Ebola Preparedness and Response Updates from FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-issues/ebolapreparedness-and-response-updates-fda [https://perma.cc/WA9G-LV3] (last updated Jan.
13, 2021). Similarly, an Ebola treatment was approved by the FDA on Oct 14, 2020, without
having needed an EUA. Id.
54
U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION FOR
VACCINES TO PREVENT COVID-19 (May 25, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/142749/
download [https://perma.cc/BZC6-DE6J].
55
Stephen M. Hahn, Patrizia Cavazzoni & Peter Marks, An Update and Behind the
Scenes: FDA’s Coronavirus Treatment Acceleration Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices/update-and-behind-scenes-fdas-coronavirustreatment-acceleration-program [https://perma.cc/BCS2-WK63] (last updated July 14,
2020).
56
See Emergency Use Authorization: Coronavirus, supra note 34 (listing current EUAs
specifically for vaccines); Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an Unapproved Product
Review Memorandum, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/144416/download [https://perma.cc/9ZGB-Q4UK] (detailing
the first vaccine EUA granted in 2020 to Pfizer).
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vaccine developers under most circumstances.57 In short, the majority of products
granted EUAs have been and are likely to remain Class II medical devices.
B. The Evolution of the EUA Statute
1. The BioShield Act in Practice
The BioShield Act of 2004 was a response to the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, and to a bioterrorism attack using anthrax spores sent through U.S. mail
that followed a week later.58 Congress used the BioShield Act to create Emergency
Use Authorizations in anticipation of another military or terrorist attack involving
chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.59 Congress
envisioned the EUA of medical countermeasures as a tool to assist with a military
response.60 Hence, the purpose of the Act was “to provide protections and
countermeasures against chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents that may be used
in a terrorist attack against the United States.”61 Under the Act, a government or
industry sponsor could request an EUA in response to an emergency, provide
sufficient evidence to permit substantive review, and, if authorized by the FDA,
immediately make its product available to the public.62 However, the vast majority
of applications for EUAs have been for biological threats to public health, rather
than the anticipated military or terrorist attack.63
In authorizing the “introduction into interstate commerce . . . of a drug, device,
or biological product intended for use in an actual or potential emergency,” the
BioShield Act contained some restrictions.64 First, it required a declaration of
emergency by the HHS Secretary, based on a domestic, military, or public health

57

See, e.g., Berkeley Lovelace Jr., From Employer Mandates to TV Ads: What Full
FDA Approval Could Mean for Covid Vaccines, CNBC (May 18, 2021, 10:12AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/18/covid-vaccines-what-full-fda-approval-means-for-you.
html [https://perma.cc/BW87-YVXU] (explaining advantages to companies of receiving full
FDA approval).
58
John A. Casciotti, Fundamentals of Military Health Law: Governance at the
Crossroads of Health Care and Military Functions, 75 A.F. L. REV. 201, 206–07 (2016).
59
Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–276, 118 Stat. 835, 853.
60
See id.
61
Id.
62
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF
MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND OTHER
STAKEHOLDERS, 0910-0595 (Jan. 2017).
63
Emergency Use Authorization: Other Current EUAs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-andpolicy-framework/emergency-use-authorization#othercurrenteuas [https://perma.cc/YK5LXUAP] (last visited Jan. 27, 2022) (showing most EUAs are related to naturally occurring
biological threats, while just three are not: an anthrax EUA, a nerve agent EUA and a freezedried plasma EUA).
64
Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–276, 118 Stat. 835, 853–59.
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emergency or a “heightened risk of attack.”65 Second, the Act provided automatic
termination of the EUA within one year, unless specific steps were taken for
renewal.66 Over time, a series of amendments modified and relaxed these
restrictions, with the last major amendment occurring in 2013.67
The Medical Products EUA statute currently requires a “declaration that the
circumstances exist justifying the authorization,” rather than requiring a declared
emergency.68 The justifying circumstances may be a “significant potential” for a
domestic, military, or public health emergency, the emergency itself, or a “material
threat” sufficient to affect national security.69 In other words, the Secretary could
decide that a significant potential for a yet-unrealized emergency provides the
circumstances to justify an EUA absent any actual emergency. Second, rather than
an automatic expiration, the termination of the EUA now occurs when the Secretary
determines “that the circumstances [justifying the authorization] have ceased to
exist” or when the product approval status changes.70
2. Key Provisions of the Medical Products EUA Statute
(a) Criteria for Issuance of Authorization
Criteria within the Medical Products EUA statute define which medical
products may be authorized for emergency use. When the HHS Secretary determines
that a CBRN agent can cause “a serious or life-threatening disease or condition,”
three elements must exist for the product to be authorized for emergency use:
1. Reasonable belief “that the product may be effective in diagnosing,
treating or preventing” the disease or condition caused by the agent,
2. “The known and potential benefits of the product . . . outweigh the
known and potential risks of the product” in treating the disease or
condition, and
3. “No adequate, approved, and available alternative to the product”
exists.71
If the determination of emergency or potential emergency is based on a CBRN
agent “that may cause . . . an imminently life-threatening and specific risk to United
States military forces” then the Secretary of Defense must request the emergency
65

Id. at 854.
Id. at 854–55.
67
John D. Blum & Jordan Paradise, Public Health Preparedness & Response: An
Exercise in Administrative Law, 20 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 13–16 (2018).
Amendments included the PREP Act of 2006, the PAHPA of 2006, and the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act (“PAHPRA”) of 2013. Id.
68
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(1) (2017).
69
Id. § 360bbb-3(b)(1).
70
Id. § 360bbb-3(b)(2).
71
Id. § 360bbb-3(c). See also Blum & Paradise, supra note 67, at 15.
66
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use.72 This special requirement when military forces are involved highlights the
envisioned use of EUAs for both public health and military emergencies in response
to a threat to either population.73 A final provision specifies “that other criteria as
the [HHS] Secretary may by regulation prescribe are satisfied,” allowing for
regulatory additions.74
(b) Scope of Authorization
The authorization for emergency use requires a statement of scope.75 The
statement must list “each disease or condition that the product may be used to
diagnose, prevent, or treat,” as well as the HHS Secretary’s conclusions that the
benefits outweigh the risks.76 Additionally, the Secretary must provide “conclusions
. . . concerning the safety and potential effectiveness of the product” and include “to
the extent practicable . . . an assessment of the available scientific evidence.”77 While
this appears to require an assessment and justification tailored to the product being
authorized, in practice, the conclusions appear to use boilerplate language to comply
with this requirement.78 Generally, the EUA is issued as an authorization letter from
the FDA, which includes the scope and other required elements.79
(c) Conditions of Authorization
The Medical Products EUA statute provides that “to the extent practicable” the
Secretary “shall . . . establish such [required] conditions on an authorization . . . as

72

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c)(4) (2017).
Id. §§ 360bbb-3(b)(1)(B), 360bbb-3(b)(6), 360bbb-3(c)(4).
74
Id. § 360bbb-3(c)(5).
75
Id. § 360bbb-3(d).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Compare Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Jill Taylor, Director, Wadsworth
Ctr. N.Y. State Dep’t Health (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/135661/download
[https://perma.cc/5BVR-AMLY], with Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Chris
Andry, Professor & Chair, Dep’t Pathology & Lab’y Med., B.U. Sch. Med. (July 10, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/140024/download [https://perma.cc/49DL-E5TW], and Letter
from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Jonathan Flint, Ctr. Neurobehavioral Genetics, UCLA
(Oct. 6, 2020), [hereinafter “Letter to Jonathan Flint”] https://www.fda.gov/media/142802
/download [https://perma.cc/74TL-ZRWH] (using identical language regardless of whether
the recipient is a government agency, a medical center, or a university).
79
See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Lauren Bricks, COO, Ipsum
Diagnostics LLC (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.fda.gov/media/136618/download
[https://perma.cc/3DZT-UTJT]; Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Robert J. Rae,
CEO, Pro-Lab Diagnostics (Aug. 23, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/141146/download
[https://perma.cc/DYL3-JCVM]; Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Michelle Ortiz,
COO, Synergy Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc. (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/14
7685/download [https://perma.cc/3FQH-ZXFF].
73
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the Secretary finds necessary or appropriate . . . .”80 Again, the required conditions
intended “to protect public health” are established at the discretion of the Secretary,
who decides whether a possible condition is practicable, necessary or appropriate.81
Moreover, the possible “appropriate conditions” listed in the subsection deal solely
with providing information about the medical product, reporting, and record
keeping.82 Even if the Secretary finds it appropriate to require them, none of these
conditions verifies the safety and efficacy of the product itself.83
In addition, the Medical Products EUA statute retains the original wording of
the BioShield Act related to manufacturing. The Secretary “may waive or limit, to
the extent appropriate” based on the circumstances, “requirements regarding current
good manufacturing practice” that would otherwise apply.84 While the FDA may
impose manufacturing-related conditions for biological products or drugs,85 a full
waiver has repeatedly been granted for EUAs issued for medical devices related to
COVID-19, including PPE (respirators),86 IVTs (diagnostic tests),87 and therapeutic
treatment systems.88
3. Discretion to Provide Flexibility
What should be clear from this review of the current statute and its
modifications since 2004 is that many requirements for granting EUAs are
discretionary and can be easily satisfied. For example, reasonable belief that a
potential benefit outweighs potential harm does not require the production of
scientific evidence. HHS is authorized to declare the need for an EUA, determine
the appropriate conditions for authorizing a particular product, waive relevant good
manufacturing practices for it, and continue to allow the product to be marketed
under the EUA indefinitely with very little guidance or regulation.89
The lack of regulatory rigor in the EUA process is intentional: Congress built
agency discretion into the statutes and subsequently expanded such discretion in an

80

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(e)(1)(a) (2017).
Id.
82
Id. § 360bbb-3(e).
83
Id.
84
Id. § 360bbb-3(e)(3).
85
See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Eli Lilly and Company (Feb. 21,
2021)
https://www.fda.gov/media/145801/download
[https://perma.cc/ELL6-XYR2]
(requiring good manufacturing practices and imposing six other manufacturing-related
conditions, including independent third-party review for therapeutic drugs).
86
See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Rochelle P. Walensky, Director,
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/1357
63/download [https://perma.cc/ULP6-MCW9].
87
See, e.g., Letter to Jonathan Flint, supra note 78.
88
See, e.g., Letter to Denise Oppermann, supra note 46.
89
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2017).
81
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effort to decrease time to market.90 While the HHS Secretary “may by regulation
prescribe” criteria and “may . . . establish such conditions on an authorization . . . as
the Secretary finds necessary or appropriate to protect the public health,” there is no
statutory obligation for the Secretary to do so.91 Similarly, “the Secretary may waive
or limit, to the extent appropriate given the applicable circumstances” good
manufacturing processes that help assure quality.92 These flexible measures may
serve well when an emergency, such as an active terrorist attack, requires immediate
action, and additional quality assurance steps would cause delays that would cost
lives. However, when an emergency has a longer duration,93 continued flexible
measures could do more harm than good, allowing inadequately tested medical
devices to enter the market without delivering a corresponding benefit.
In recent decisions, the FDA has used its discretion under the Medical Products
EUA statute to allow companies to validate their COVID-19 tests and begin
marketing or using the tests with simple notification to the FDA.94 Although the
FDA expected companies would then file EUA applications within a reasonable
time, its policy allowed medical devices onto the market without any initial
oversight. The relaxed requirements for EUAs are a departure from the established
FDA processes used in overseeing foods, prescription drugs, and other medical
products, and are designed as a kind of short-cut. However, weaker regulations also
open the door for diminished safety and effectiveness when products are introduced
to the market with minimal quality assurance.95
90

Compare National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108136, 117 Stat. 1392, 1684 (allowing the declaration of “an emergency justifying the
authorization” based only upon determination of “military emergency . . .”), with Project
Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835, 854 (adding the HHS Secretary’s
determination that “a public health emergency” exists as a basis for authorization), and
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–5,
127 Stat. 161, 180–81 (adding “the identification of a material threat” as a basis and
expanding the Secretary’s power to waive or limit requirements) (each Act codified at 21
U.S.C. § 360bbb-3).
91
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2017).
92
Id.
93
The Zika emergency, for example, continues to be active years after its initial
February 26, 2014 declaration. See Emergency Use Authorizations for Medical Devices,
supra note 26.
94
POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE-2019 TESTS DURING THE PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY (REVISED), U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (May 11, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/135659/download [https://perma.cc/K7RA-NY3K] (indicating
commercial manufacturers could distribute and laboratories could use diagnostic tests prior
to EUA submission).
95
Perhaps recognizing that testing medical devices for quality assurance is desirable,
the PAHPRA of 2013 included a new subsection (m) for “categorization of laboratory tests
associated with devices subject to authorization.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(m) (2017). This
section allows the Secretary to categorize a laboratory examination related to the device if
the categorization “would be beneficial to protecting the public health.” Id. Yet, the FDA did
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C. Regulatory Gap Between FDA Approval and EUAs
In contrast with the EUA process, the FDA requires “compliance with good
manufacturing practices” for approval of medical devices, such as IVD products96
and drugs for human consumption.97 “The essential purpose” of such compliance “is
to maintain the safety and quality” of medical products “during the manufacturing
stage, rather than to address problems only after they have caused harm to
consumers.”98 Manufacturing practices required for FDA approval include testing
and quality system requirements to help guarantee that the products will be safe and
effective when introduced to commerce.99 The FDA regulations may also require
manufacturers to track medical devices and perform postmarket surveillance.100
While EUAs have successfully reduced the regulatory burden and shortened
time to market, they have also removed the quality controls and performance
standards that are part of the FDA approval process. The language of the Medical
Products EUA statute mandates conditions for unapproved products to ensure
information sharing and reporting of adverse events, but it does not address other
quality concerns.101 Under such relaxed standards, devices in which the failure mode
is not easily detected may not be reported, even as the devices cause harm to their
users or to public health in general.
Such a result occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic when rapid diagnostic
tests proved to have high rates of false negatives102 and when authorized N95
respirators did not adequately filter particles.103 Although previous biological threats
or emergencies were addressed more reliably than the COVID-19 pandemic,104 the
lack of statutory language to help ensure safety and effectiveness when a device is
introduced in the market left the regulatory scheme prone to failure. Particularly if
successes in the past were due to institutional knowledge and optional employment

not incorporate this discretionary element in its policies or EUAs for medical devices during
the COVID-19 pandemic.
96
21 C.F.R. § 809.20 (2020).
97
Id. §§ 210–211.208.
98
U.S. v. Various Articles of Drug, No. H-95-912, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22867, at
*10 (D. Md. June 6, 1996).
99
See Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. §§ 820–820.250 (2020).
100
Id. §§ 821–822.38.
101
See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2017).
102
See Abbott ID NOW Point-of-Care Test, supra note 6.
103
See Certain Filtering Facepiece Respirators from China May Not Provide Adequate
Respiratory Protection – Letter to Health Care Providers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/letters-health-care-providers/certain-filtering-facepie
ce-respirators-china-may-not-provide-adequate-respiratory-protection-letter [https://perma.
cc/Z3ZF-8JF2] (last updated Oct. 15, 2020).
104
See, e.g., Blum & Paradise, supra note 67, at 17–21 (discussing the effective use of
EUAs in response to the ZIKA virus).
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of unmandated safeguards,105 the reliance on personnel rather than protocol cannot
guarantee consistent future results and leaves public health vulnerable.
Furthermore, the FDA standard for approval of medical devices and drugs is
proof of safety and effectiveness.106 In comparison, the EUA mechanism requires
only a conclusion that the medical product has potential to be effective, without
requiring proof.107 The risk of harm from an authorized product is lessened by the
fact that most EUAs are issued for Class II medical devices, which typically have
fewer serious risks than Class III devices, and for FDA-approved drugs to be used
in an unapproved manner.108 But the EUA mechanism does not mitigate the risk of
harm from ineffective drugs or medical devices, and it may underestimate
unanticipated harmful effects when those products are used for a particular illness.
The problem is not, however, simply that the EUA process lacks the rigorous
standards that the FDA uses for approving medical products. The regulatory gap
between the mechanisms for approval and authorization does not, by itself, explain
why EUAs have been used successfully in the past,109 while the response to COVID19 has been called “disastrous,”110 a failure whose magnitude is “astonishing.”111
The problem, as explored below, is a regulatory gap combined with inconsistent
application of available regulatory measures.
D. The Impact on National Health: COVID-19 Case Study
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the regulatory gap between the FDA approval
standards and the requirements for EUAs resulted in predictable problems. Even
while following the Medical Product EUA statute, the decisions and actions taken
by the agency caused delays without eliminating burdensome requirements or
preventing fraudulent activities. These issues threatened national public health
precisely at a time when America needed to rely upon the FDA for effective
protection.
First, the discretionary nature of the statute governing EUAs left opportunity
for vacillation between over- and under-regulation. When laboratories initially
105

Although this is a supposition, it is based on the wide discretion granted to FDA
personnel in determining appropriate protocols for EUAs.
106
See Casciotti, supra note 58, at 207.
107
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c)(2)(B) (2017) (allowing authorization if the FDA believes
“the known and potential benefits of the product, when used to diagnose, prevent, or treat
such disease or condition, outweigh the known and potential risks of the product”).
108
See Emergency Use Authorization: Coronavirus, supra note 34.
109
See Blum & Paradise, supra note 67, at 19 (attributing “an international decline in
the incidence of Zika” to “the availability of detection assays through issuance of emergency
use authorizations”).
110
Martha Kinsella, COVID-19 Shows the Disastrous Results of What Happens When
Science Is Sacrificed for Politics, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 11, 2020)
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/covid-19-shows-disastrous-resul
ts-what-happens-when-science-sacrificed [https://perma.cc/6DAC-XGGN].
111
Editors, Dying in a Leadership Vacuum, 385 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1479, 1479 (2020).

2022]

EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATIONS

431

began developing COVID-19 tests, the FDA believed its emergency powers
included “the power to regulate clinical laboratory services.”112 The FDA has clear
authority to “regulate test kits,” including requiring EUAs for unapproved IVD test
kits and sample collection kits to be marketed.113 However, Congress has not given
the FDA clear authority for laboratory developed tests (LDTs), which are “intended
for clinical use and designed, manufactured, and used within a single laboratory.”114
Thus, when those tests are shared outside the laboratory, they enter a regulatory grey
area, and the FDA issued four guidance documents from February to May 2020,
with “evolving versions of the FDA’s policy on EUAs for COVID-19 diagnostic
tests.”115
In the uncertainty regarding its emergency powers, the FDA instructed
laboratories to stop any use of LDTs without authorization.116 In one case, the FDA
allowed testing of new samples but prohibited the lab from performing retrospective
testing on samples it had previously collected.117 In reaction to the negative
outcomes from this over-restriction, the FDA reversed course for the regulation of
antibody (serological) tests.118 The agency called attention to its new policy
“explaining that FDA does not intend to object when developers of serological tests
market or use their tests without prior FDA review” where certain conditions were

112

See Barbara J. Evans & Ellen Wright Clayton, Deadly Delay: The FDA’s Role in
America’s COVID-Testing Debacle, 130 YALE L.J. F. 78, 80–82 (2020) (discussing FDA
regulation of in-house laboratory testing under its emergency powers early in the pandemic).
113
Id. at 86.
114
Id. at 87.
115
Id. at 82–83.
116
Id. at 85–85.
117
Megan Doerr & Jennifer K. Wagner, Research Ethics in a Pandemic:
Considerations for the Use of Research Infrastructure and Resources for Public Health
Activities, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 2–3 (2020). The Seattle Flu Study (SFS) collected nasal
swabs for annual flu research and petitioned the FDA “for permission to use [its] existing
samples bank to track COVID-19 spread.” Id. The SFS team then “decided to test the samples
without the explicit approval of public health authorities.” Id. After a positive result was
confirmed by an independent Washington laboratory, “FDA regulators ordered SFS to stop
retrospective testing of their existing samples.” Id. Later, the FDA determined that SFS could
test new samples, while still prohibiting retrospective testing. Id.
118
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update:
Serological Test Validation and Education Efforts, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-serological-test-validation-and-educationefforts [https://perma.cc/J5KU-ZPMK] (last updated Apr. 18, 2020) (“Recognizing that
more flexibility was needed during a pandemic of this scale and speed, and incorporating
feedback from the medical community, states and test developers, we have also provided
regulatory flexibility for serological tests in an effort to provide laboratories and health care
providers with early access to these tests with the understanding that the FDA had not
reviewed or authorized (or ‘approved’) them . . . .”).
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met.119 Changing policies and guidance documents discouraged development for
early tests and later enabled market introduction of unreliable and unreviewed
tests.120
Second, FDA policies created delays in the availability of key protective
measures identified by the CDC to help stop the spread of a pandemic. The FDA
authorized the first IVD test for COVID-19 use, a test developed by the CDC and
intended to be the primary test used in the United States, on February 4, 2020.121 The
next non-CDC test, the cobas SARS-CoV-2, was authorized on March 12, 2020,
more than five weeks later.122 The impact of this five-week delay would have been
smaller if the CDC test had proved reliable.123 However, the initial CDC test had
cross-contamination issues that compliance with good manufacturing practices
could have helped avoid.124 Further, while the CDC validated its test in the
laboratory, the final manufactured test was not tested using the quality systems
required for non-emergency FDA approval.125
The FDA requires reporting of adverse events once an approved or authorized
medical product is in the field as an after-the-fact safety measure to detect unknown
or unanticipated problems.126 Reporting from public health labs using the CDC test
raised the alarm about quality problems, but the CDC took a month to correct the
problem, “exacerbating nationwide delays in testing.”127 The lack of a reliable test
119

Id.
See Walter G. Johnson & Gary E. Marchant, Legislating in the Time of a Pandemic:
Window of Opportunity or Invitation for Recklessness?, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 1 (2020).
121
Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Robert R. Redfield, Director, Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/134919/download
[https://perma.cc/N6YV-ML7K] (“On February 4, 2020, based on [a] request [by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)], the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued
a letter authorizing emergency use of the CDC 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) RealTime Reverse Transcriptase (RT)-PCR Diagnostic Panel . . . .”).
122
Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Rita Hoady, Senior Manager, Roche
Molecular Systems (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/136046/download
[https://perma.cc/7K42-58UM] (“On March 12, 2020, based on your request the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) issued a letter authorizing the emergency use of the cobas
SARS-CoV-2 for use on the cobas 6800/8800 Systems for the qualitative detection of nucleic
acid from SARS-CoV-2.”).
123
See David Willman, Contamination at CDC Lab Delayed Rollout of Coronavirus
Tests, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/contam
ination-at-cdc-lab-delayed-rollout-of-coronavirus-tests/2020/04/18/fd7d3824-7139-11ea-aa
80-c2470c6b2034_story.html [https://perma.cc/D36J-FSS6] (indicating that weeks were lost
while the CDC worked to address a false positive accuracy problem in its original test).
124
Id.; see also Facts About the Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs), U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/pharmaceutical-quality-resources/factsabout-current-good-manufacturing-practices-cgmps [https://perma.cc/4YAF-XFL7] (last
updated June 1, 2021).
125
Willman, supra note 123; see also Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. §§ 820–
820.250 (2020).
126
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(iii) (2017); 21 C.F.R. § 821.1 (2020).
127
Willman, supra note 123.
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“kept the public health labs from performing disease surveillance intended to predict
and minimize harm before the virus became widely established in the United
States.”128 The “nation’s inability to rapidly expand the availability of testing”
magnified the impact, resulting in greater spread of the disease.129
Third, when the FDA relaxed the EUA process, allowing companies to
introduce their medical products into the market before submitting an EUA
application or without providing test data, the result was an increase in fraudulent
and non-performing devices.130 Where the agency was initially too restrictive in
regulating EUAs for IVD tests, its regulation of antibody tests was too lax, forcing
a subsequent policy modification.131 The FDA discovered that flexible guidelines
were used by some manufacturers to make false claims and that “a concerning
number of commercial serology tests are . . . performing poorly based on an
independent evaluation by the [National Institute of Health].”132
Fourth, even when authorizing a medical product for emergency use, the FDA’s
processes were initially antiquated and burdensome to applicants.133 Some labs
opted to forgo deployment of their diagnostic tests “because the EUA application
was too difficult,” waiting instead for “a more lenient regulatory framework.”134
Fortunately, the FDA has modified its requirements and processes during the course
of the pandemic to make them simpler and speedier.135 Additionally, numerous
scholars have proposed solutions specifically to facilitate scientific developments
and support collaborative research on public health issues during a future
emergency.136
128

Id.
Id.
130
See, e.g., Insight into FDA’s Revised Policy on Antibody Tests: Prioritizing Access
and Accuracy, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fdavoices/insight-fdas-revised-policy-antibody-tests-prioritizing-access-and-accuracy [https://
perma.cc/VB6G-UNE3] (last updated May 4, 2020) (“We unfortunately see unscrupulous
actors marketing fraudulent test kits and using the pandemic as an opportunity to take
advantage of Americans’ anxiety.”).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Chaarushena Deb, Osman Moneer & W. Nicholson Price II, COVID-19, SingleSourced Diagnostic Tests, and Innovation Policy, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 5 (2020). For
example, applicants were initially required to file “documents physically on CDs or thumb
drives” by mailing them to the FDA, resulting in nonproductive transfer delays. Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Those solutions include pooling research results globally to accelerate scientific
discovery, providing intellectual property rights for later licensing to enable early sharing,
broadening patent infringement exemptions for lifesaving technologies and development,
and simplifying the EUA application process for non-manufacturing developers of medical
devices. See Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Treatment of the Novel COVID-19: Why Costa
Rica’s Proposal for the Creation of a Global Pooling Mechanism Deserves Serious
Consideration, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 9 (2020) (discussing Costa Rica’s proposal for a
129
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In summary, the gap between the tightly regulated FDA approval process and
the loosely regulated EUA process has allowed the FDA to swing between the two
extremes.137 On one end, the FDA employs restrictive policies that may make safe
and effective medical products unavailable when needed during a public health
emergency. On the other end, the FDA takes a hands-off approach that provides the
market with medical products that may not work as intended and may not be safe.
Either extreme fails to meet the requirement for reliable and readily available
medical products to help protect the public from deadly infectious disease.
E. A Proposed Solution: Post-manufacturing Independent Testing
1. One Small Step for Regulation
The FDA’s primary mission is to “protect public health by assuring the safety,
efficacy and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, [and]
medical devices . . . .”138 The FDA also supports the Nation’s counterterrorism
capability by “fostering development of medical products to respond to deliberate
and naturally emerging public health threats,” enabled by the Medical Products EUA
statute.139 These dual roles can be in conflict when the FDA is pressured to quickly
authorize emergency use in response to a health threat at the expense of its standards
for safety and efficacy. The question is how to reconcile these competing objectives
to provide better assurance of efficacy during a public health emergency.
The answer is to leave the EUA process intact, retaining its key features of
flexibility with discretionary action to respond quickly to a domestic, military, or
public health emergency, but to add a small, vital step to ensure safety and efficacy
for the public. That step is post-manufacturing independent testing of critical
performance parameters.
The first element of this proposal is to require post-manufacturing testing,
performed after the device is manufactured but before it is released to the market.
global intellectual property pooling mechanism); Adrian Thorogood, Policy-aware Data
Lakes: A Flexible Approach to Achieve Legal Interoperability for Global Research
Collaborations, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1 (2020) (proposing a “policy-aware data lake” as a
new model allowing countries to share scientific data globally during public health
emergencies); Jorge L. Contreras, Research and Repair: Expanding Exceptions to Patent
Infringement in Response to a Pandemic, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 2 (2020) (recommending
expansion of two “long-standing but narrow exemptions from patent infringement” to
facilitate research development during a public health crisis); Deb et al., supra note 133.
137
Note that political pressures have also played a role unique to the COVID-19
pandemic. An examination of political factors is beyond the scope of this paper, however,
the recommendations included in section III.E could reduce the likelihood of agency
discretion being used for political purposes.
138
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MISSION POSSIBLE: HOW FDA CAN MOVE AT THE
SPEED OF SCIENCE, (2015), https://www.fda.gov/media/93524/download [https://perma.cc/
W6DQ-4832].
139
Id.
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Unlike FDA-approved devices, devices that receive EUAs are not required by statute
to be tested after manufacturing.140 As a result, a device may perform as expected
during its development phase, and the design of the device may be sound, but an
error that is introduced in the manufacturing process may go undetected. The timecritical early phases of an emergency may further encourage a manufacturer to rely
on its design and rush a defectively manufactured device to market. This was
precisely the case with the original IVD test kits developed by the CDC to detect
COVID-19 in patient samples.141 The devices were cross-contaminated so that the
test kits produced false positive results, detecting COVID-19 even when the virus
was not present in the samples.142 If post-manufacturing testing had been required
as a condition of the EUA, the error would likely have been detected and corrected
before the defective devices were sent to laboratories for use.
The second element of this proposal is to require independent testing of critical
performance parameters to verify that the device performs as intended and within
established criteria. In the example of the CDC’s IVD test kits, the kits were intended
to reliably detect COVID-19 in samples that contained the virus. Consequently,
when a kit showed a positive reading for a sample that was known to be free of the
COVID-19 virus and should have produced a negative result, a laboratory could
quickly identify that the kit was defective.143
A greater danger may be the case where the untested device is not discovered
to have defects. For example, in the case of PPE, the FDA issued an umbrella EUA
for specific filtering respirators made in China that were intended to filter 95% of
the airborne particles.144 Unfortunately, subsequent testing revealed that dozens of
the Chinese respirators failed to provide adequate filtration.145 By the time the FDA
revised its EUA for these devices and warned health care providers with its letter on
May 7, 2020, the substandard respirators had been legally authorized for import into
the United States for more than one month.146 A regulatory requirement that a device
perform according to its stated parameters—in this case, 95% filtration—would
likely have prevented the distribution and use of a faulty product.
140

Supra, Section III.B.2(c).
See Willman, supra note 123.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Matthew Perrone, US Pulls Permission for Chinese Masks Found Defective, U.S.
NEWS (May 8, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2020-05-08/uspulls-permission-for-chinese-masks-found-defective [https://perma.cc/967Z-BTDN]; see
also Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Manufacturers of Imported, Non-NIOSHApproved Disposable Filtering Facepiece Respirators Manufactured in China; Health Care
Personnel; Hospital Purchasing Departments and Distributors; Importers and Commercial
Wholesalers; and Any Other Applicable Stakeholders (May 7, 2020), [hereinafter “Letter to
Manufacturers of Imported Respirators”] https://www.nj.gov/health/workplacehealthand
safety/documents/peosh/EUA-FFRs-Manufactured-China-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/38F6VTEF].
145
Perrone, supra note 144.
146
Letter to Manufacturers of Imported Respirators, supra note 144.
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The third element of this proposal is independent testing, requiring the testing
of the device to be conducted by an independent laboratory or agency. In the
example of the Chinese respirators, the FDA had established performance criteria,
and the respirators were eligible for an EUA if the manufacturer’s test reports
demonstrated adequate filtration.147 The FDA granted the EUA based on data
provided by the manufacturer showing that respirators met the criteria. Subsequent
testing by NIOSH and other independent labs,148 however, showed much lower
filtration rates for some respirators than the manufacturers claimed for their
devices.149 Independent laboratories or testing agencies can use specialized
equipment to reliably measure the performance of devices150 and lack an incentive
to make fraudulent claims about the devices.151 If independent testing had been
required for the devices, any respirators that failed to perform properly would have
been denied an EUA and would not have been permitted to enter the U.S. market.152
Thus, the three key elements of this proposal are that 1) the testing occurs after
manufacturing, when the device is ready for public use; 2) the testing verifies that
the device performs as expected according to established criteria; and 3) an
independent agency, rather than the manufacturer, conducts the testing.
While this proposal introduces a new verification step, such a solution does not
add a large regulatory burden to the applicant. In fact, it removes a step that normally
falls to the applicant under good manufacturing practices: verifying that the medical
product conforms to specifications and performs correctly.153 The burden of
147

Id.
Although not FDA-approved, MIT labs independently performed filtration testing,
having identified the potential for fraud with masks that were not certified by a U.S. agency;
see Kylie Foy, Tests Verify If Uncertified N95 Masks Are Effective, MIT (May 7, 2020),
https://www.ll.mit.edu/news/tests-verify-if-uncertified-n95-masks-are-effective [https://per
ma.cc/LJR7-278M].
149
Id.; Perrone, supra note 144.
150
See e.g., Foy, supra note 148 (describing the setup and protocol used by MIT to test
filtration efficiency).
151
For example, NIOSH is federal agency that “has the mandate to assure ‘every man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources.’” About NIOSH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about/default.html [https://perma.cc/QZX2-42VY].
152
Good manufacturing practices, for example, require establishing “procedures for
finished device acceptance to ensure that the production run [of the devices] meets
acceptance criteria.” 21 C.F.R. § 820.80(d) (2020). Finished devices are then “held in
quarantine or otherwise adequately controlled” until authorized to be released for
distribution. Id. In addition, sampling plans can be developed using statistical techniques to
ensure the tested products are representative of the production run. See id. § 820.250.
153
“The essential purpose of [the FDA’s Current Good Manufacturing Practice]
requirements is to maintain the safety and quality of drugs during the manufacturing stage,
rather than to address problems only after they have caused harm to consumers.” U.S. v.
Various Articles of Drug, No. H-95-912, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22867, at *10 (D. Md. June
6, 1996) (citation omitted). To be clear, a manufacturer may wish to continue to perform its
148
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verification would be transferred instead to an independent agency that is qualified
and prepared to test performance parameters. Fortunately, during circumstances in
which an EUA may be issued, the FDA has additional resources at its disposal to
respond to the emergency and to work in cooperation with other agencies.154 Further,
the speed with which independent labs have found performance shortcomings during
the coronavirus pandemic indicates a post-manufacturing verification measure
would be unlikely to appreciably delay market introduction dates.
In short, the proposed requirement for independent testing prior to shipment is
designed to be a targeted, workable solution specifically to fill the regulatory gap
and ensure that medical devices authorized under the Medical Product EUA statute
are safe and effective.
2. One (Modest) Leap for Pandemic Preparedness
The post-manufacturing testing solution proposed in this Note focuses squarely
on ensuring the safety and effectiveness of the medical product, however, it offers
additional advantages for pandemic preparedness in general.
First, a required testing procedure for Class II medical devices removes an
element of uncertainty for the FDA when an emergency first arises. Hesitation and
inconsistent steps, caused by the identified regulatory gap and illustrated by the
COVID-19 examples, have interfered with the FDA’s ability to fulfill its objective
of ensuring swift availability of safe products. Thus, in the early phases of a
pandemic, when the CDC, research laboratories, manufacturers, and the FDA are
moving quickly to address the emergent concern, the standard procedure would be
a certain step, an essential means to avoid non-performing or faulty medical devices.
Additionally, the testing proposed here could be the “stitch in time” that saves weeks
that would otherwise be required for detection and correction. It could help prevent
the stop and go, revise and retract, confusion of messages that characterized the early
days of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is possible that, even though the proposed
testing adds a new step to the EUA process, all parties would ultimately welcome
the clarity and benefits it produces.
Second, independent testing labs can collect objective data for use in
comparisons between medical devices that perform the same function. On
September 15, 2020, months after the start of the pandemic, the FDA requested
performance data for certain authorized COVID-19 molecular diagnostic tests.155
own post-manufacturing quality assurance, but the proposed EUA testing requirement will,
by definition, fall externally to an independent lab or agency and does not add a burden to
the supplier.
154
Under the Project BioShield Act of 2004, “the Secretary is authorized . . . to enter
into interagency agreements and other collaborative undertakings with other agencies of the
United States Government.” Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835, 851.
155
News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA
Publishes Comparative Performance Data for COVID-19 Molecular Diagnostic Tests (Sept.
15, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-
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However, many suppliers opted not to return test results or provided data that could
not be used.156 When the FDA compared the usable supplier data, sensitivity testing
for the authorized SARS-CoV-2 molecular diagnostic tests showed great variation,
with levels of detection ranging from 180 to 540,000 NDU/mL.157 In other words,
some IVD tests were much more effective in detecting a small amount of viral
material and identifying a positive COVID-19 result than others, yet comparisons
between the tests were not available in the first six months that COVID-19 testing
was performed.
If all EAUs required mandatory testing, sets of incomplete performance data
would not be an issue. Instead, the FDA would collect valid data using consistent
measurement standards for each authorized medical device, and based on the data,
could improve plans for making effective devices widely available. For example, if
comparative information were available when IVD tests were first developed, the
FDA could avoid large discrepancies in test performance by identifying and
selectively authorizing only the most effective tests. Manufacturers could then
develop supply strategies and concentrate production efforts on those tests, leading
to better availability of reliable tests. Finally, such standardization might enable
faster diagnostic test results, solving another problem that arose during the COVID19 pandemic.158 Because delayed test results can leave people uncertain whether to
self-quarantine while awaiting their results or continue interacting in the community,
potentially spreading contagion,159 any improvement in rapid, accurate diagnostic
results would likely translate to improved public health outcomes.
Third, the proposed testing encourages suppliers to employ manufacturing
practices that consistently produce quality devices. During the COVID-19
pandemic, the FDA reminded manufacturers that medical devices are subject to
ongoing surveillance and that respirators may, for example, be “subject to random
sampling and NIOSH testing upon importation into the United States.”160 This
update-fda-publishes-comparative-performance-data-covid-19-molecular-diagnostic
[https://perma.cc/7HA2-3VPQ].
156
See SARS-CoV-2 Reference Panel Comparative Data, Table 1, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/coronavirus-covid-19-and-medical-devices
/sars-cov-2-reference-panel-comparative-data [https://perma.cc/Q7KG-WP8V] (last visited
July 7, 2021).
157
Id. at Table 2. The unit of measure, NDU/mL, refers to Nucleic Acid Amplification
Test (NAAT) Detectable Units (NDU) per milliliter. Id. The table data show that the least
sensitive test required 3000 times the amount of detectible viral material to detect the virus
as the most sensitive test.
158
Jamie Ducharme, Patients Are Waiting Weeks for COVID-19 Test Results. Here’s
Why That’s a Huge Problem, TIME (Jul. 22, 2020, 11:07 AM),
https://time.com/5869130/covid-19-test-delays/ [https://perma.cc/MZ5P-RPHE]. Although
standardization, by itself, does not result in faster test results, the FDA could selectively
approve tests that have a faster turnaround time, and testing centers could develop
streamlined procedures to reduce processing time for those authorized tests. See id. (offering
additional time-saving testing ideas).
159
Id.
160
Letter to Manufacturers of Imported Respirators, supra note 144, at 5.
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reminder was likely intended to prompt those suppliers to make in-house
improvements to be certain their products would pass any subsequent test conducted
by NIOSH. A system of independent verification creates an incentive for suppliers
to focus on quality and to detect and fix problems upstream in the manufacturing
process. Consequently, a regulatory change that requires post-manufacturing
independent testing of critical performance parameters benefits public health by
nudging suppliers toward making higher quality medical products.
A final benefit is that, if needed, the proposal could be limited to just two types
of medical devices and still achieve outsized results. The medical devices almost
certain to be subjects of EUAs are diagnostic tests and respirators. These devices
perform a critical role in identifying patients who are sick and preventing the spread
of disease to people who are healthy. If these devices are unreliable, they can pose
a danger to public health, giving people a false sense of security as they unwittingly
spread disease. The FDA validates this concern, warning in its policy guide that
“false results can negatively impact not only the individual patient but also can have
broad public health impact.”161
Happily, implementing mandatory post-manufacturing testing for just
diagnostic tests and respirators would cover 90% of the EUAs issued. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA compared performance of only selected molecular
IVD tests, but it tracked other categories of EUAs it granted.162 By October 2020,
more than 84% of EUAs were for IVD tests, and another 7% were for PPE,
confirming that the overwhelming majority of EUAs are issued for these two Class
II medical devices.163 The performance metrics for IVD tests and respirators are
established and relatively straightforward.164 In fact, NIOSH is already performing
respirator testing for industry,165 and the FDA could identify independent labs or
create an agency to provide similar services for IVD tests.
In summary, the FDA could concentrate its efforts on the proposed postmanufacturing testing of IVD tests and respirators and achieve disproportionate
benefits. Not only would the FDA ensure the safety and effectiveness of almost all
161

POLICY FOR CORONAVIRUS DISEASE-2019 TESTS, supra note 94, at 8.
Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emerg
ency-use-authorization [https://perma.cc/CL87-SXB5] (last visited July 7, 2021).
163
See id. The percentages were calculated by tallying the number of EUAs listed for
each type of device and dividing by the total number of issued EUAs. In comparison, drugs
and biologic products, for which testing procedures would likely be significantly more
complicated, only received 1% of the EUAs during this period. Id.
164
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 84 (respirators); Recognized Consensus Standards, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (June 7, 2021), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfStan
dards/Results.cfm?start_search=1&ProductCode=&Category=&Type=&Title=&Organizati
on=&ReferenceNumber=C24-A&RegulationNumber=&PAGENUM=10 [https://perma.cc
/8M3M-EJHL] (identifying the Statistical Quality Control for Quantitative Measurement
Procedures standard for InVitro Diagnostics).
165
It should be noted that this testing is performed for a fee, as outlined in 42 C.F.R. §§
84.20–84.24. A similar fee structure could be developed for IVD tests to help defray the costs
of this testing proposal.
162
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medical products it authorizes during an emergency, but it could also address the
shortcomings identified previously in Section III.D and improve its general
pandemic preparedness and response.
3. The Means to Implement: Legislative Action
Currently, only the Medical Products EUA statute, Section 360bbb-3 of the
U.S. Code, governs the issuance of EUAs.166 Under subsection (i), “actions under
the authority of this section . . . are committed to agency discretion,”167 allowing the
“principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans,” HHS, to take actions
it judges to be appropriate.168 Congress also generally prohibits states from imposing
additional or more stringent requirements for medical devices.169 Consequently, the
HHS Secretary has few constraints and broad decision-making power for issuing
EUAs. But despite this authority, the Secretary has not opted to add quality-focused
conditions or to require proof of performance of the ready-for-market product in
numerous EUAs during the COVID-19 pandemic.170
Given the apparent reluctance of HHS (or more narrowly, the FDA) to use its
authority to verify the quality of medical devices that are anticipated to be essential
during infectious disease emergencies, the responsibility likely falls to Congress.
Congressional action to amend 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 and mandate testing by an
independent FDA-approved lab would fill the identified regulatory gap.171
Alternatively, the FDA itself could be required to test randomly selected samples of
manufactured product to guarantee the safety and efficacy of the product entering
the market. In either case, the statutory amendment could leverage current CFR
regulatory language that requires verification for FDA-approved products.
For example, the additional regulation should require that “acceptance
criteria”172 or “quality system requirements”173 be identified for the product. It
appears that such criteria are generally determined by the manufacturer, but the FDA
could establish minimum performance criteria instead of or in addition to
manufacturers’ criteria.174 Further regulatory language should state that “product
166

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2017).
Id.
168
Introduction: About HHS, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/strategic-plan/introduction/index.html [https://perma.cc/DZQ3GJYF] (last visited July 7, 2021).
169
21 U.S.C. § 360k.
170
Emergency Use Authorization, supra note 162.
171
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(m) provides for “categorization of laboratory tests associated
with devices subject to authorization” if the categorization “would be beneficial to protecting
the public health.” A laboratory test that verifies the safety and efficacy of a medical device
would also be beneficial to protecting public health, and the new language could be added
within this section.
172
See 21 C.F.R. § 820.86 (2020).
173
See id. §§ 820.20–820.25.
174
Id. § 820.80.
167
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shall be tested, or otherwise verified” by an independent laboratory or government
agency prior to the issuance of the EUA. Finally, the statutory addition should state
that test results must show “conformance of product with acceptance criteria” for
the device to receive an EUA.175 Procedures should be developed to obtain a sample
of finished product and expedite the testing to provide an answer with minimal
delay. A device that does not meet acceptance criteria based on test results should
not be given an EUA.176
4. Beyond Devices
Drugs and biologics not only represent a much smaller percentage of products
authorized for use in an emergency, they also have more stringent provisions for
establishing that they can be safely used by humans.177 When the FDA issues an
EUA for a drug, and the safety of that drug has been previously demonstrated, it
remains a question whether the drug will work as intended in treating the new
illness.178 This question cannot be answered as easily as a test can demonstrate the
performance of a device, especially because the FDA is cautious about authorizing
use of an unproven drug unless patients are very sick and have exhausted other
options.179 And, even where potential therapeutics are FDA-approved drugs whose
safety and efficacy have been proven for other uses, the promotion for off-label use
can have negative consequences.180 Given these complications for drugs and
biologics, the proposal recommended in this Note may be best limited to medical
devices.181
Additionally, this proposal envisions a typical usage in the future when a new
disease surfaces on a global scale and threatens public health. However, its measures
would, in principle, be equally effective for protective equipment used in the event
of a chemical, bioterror, radiation, or nuclear threat.182 Protective equipment that
175

Id. §§ 820.20, 820.86.
See id. § 820.80(d). “Finished devices shall not be released for distribution until: (1)
The activities required in the DMR are completed; (2) the associated data and documentation
is reviewed; (3) the release is authorized by the signature of a designated individual(s); and
(4) the authorization is dated.” Id.
177
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 11.60 (2020).
178
See Birnkrant & Cox, supra note 47.
179
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R § 312.305 (2021) (outlining criteria for expanded access to
investigational drugs based on life-threatening conditions).
180
See generally Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 48 (discussing the negative
consequences of prescribing drugs for unapproved uses and proposing regulation of
experimental use even during a public health crisis).
181
This is not to suggest that drugs and biologics should escape testing. It is simply to
acknowledge that the testing recommended here may be inadequate or duplicative of other
measures that are already in place for those products.
182
For a detailed discussion of biological attacks, see Barry Kellman & Zachary D.
Clopton, A Global Architecture for Medical Counter-Measure Preparedness Against
Bioviolence, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 550 (2009). See also Brooke Courtney, Susan Sherman
176

442

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

demonstrates effective performance, such as masks or other shielding personal gear,
can then be authorized for distribution in the market. Fortunately, testing to verify
the quality and performance of equipment can and should be completed on an
ongoing basis, prior to an emergency.183 Such measures ensure that stockpiled
equipment meets standards and will provide the expected protection against threats.
The FDA can utilize those same quality measures to verify performance and
authorize use of unapproved equipment to reduce risk and achieve efficacy goals.184
IV. CONCLUSION
The repeated struggles by regulators to identify the correct level of oversight
needed to protect public health during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the need
for clear guidelines. Although the FDA is permitted to require more stringent testing
or verification prior to authorization of use, during this public health emergency, it
has erred on the side of issuing the EUA or even allowing medical devices to enter
the market prior to the issuance of an EUA. This may be due to the FDA’s dual role
as a slow and careful regulator for full FDA approval and as a rapid response
facilitator for emergency use without FDA approval, making prioritization of
conflicting objectives difficult.
New legislation requiring verification that a medical device works as claimed
prior to introduction to the market, rather than afterwards, could significantly reduce
EUA revisions or product recalls due to quality concerns. This is especially true
when the testing protocols are relatively simple to implement for the medical devices
most likely to require EUAs. Given that the need to recall or discontinue use of
defective medical devices may cause delays in developing or sourcing effective
alternatives,185 the new testing requirement would help the FDA meet its objectives
without sacrificing speed. Moreover, the rapid availability of effective medical
devices would support CDC public health objectives of identifying disease and
preventing spread during a new outbreak. Finally, this proposal would help restore
public confidence in the FDA by reducing the need for recalls and warnings and by
strengthening the FDA’s ability to respond quickly and efficiently in protecting
Americans during a time of pandemic.
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